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Gyan Chandra, Ph.D.

Of the four important groups engaged
in the preparation, use and distribution
of corporate annual reports, namely,
corporate management, public accoun
tants, security analysts, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission,
much of the burden of improving dis
closure in corporate annual reports rests
with the public accounting profession.
The profession has been conceded that
trust and responsibility both by the
reluctance of other concerned groups
and by the unique position enjoyed by
the public accountants in the United
States. However, the success of the
profession in bringing about disclosure
improvements depends much on its un
derstanding of the users’ information re
quirements. The principal contention of
this paper is that at present a lack of un
derstanding exists in the public
accounting profession regarding infor
mation requirements of the users of cor
porate annual reports. Both the publish
ed literature on the subject and an in
vestigation carried out by this author
support the contention.

User Discontent With Corporate An
nual Reports
Corporate annual reports provide
management with an important vehicle
for communication with the outside
world. The United States Congress
realized the importance of disclosure in
corporate reports when it passed the
Securities Act of 1933. In fact, the
Securities Act has often been called a
disclosure statute and its long title reads:
“An Act to provide full and fair dis
closure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds
in the sale thereof. . .”. To adminis
ter the disclosure statute, Congress
created the Securities and Ex
change Commission by an act in 1934.
Despite these and other efforts toward
improvement the published evidence
suggests that corporate disclosure prac
tices have not reached a satisfactory
stage. The investors and their
counselors are dissatisfied with the
published corporate reports and they
often resort to sources other than cor

porate financial statements for needed
information.1 In fact, Roper in his depth
interviews with various types of users of
corporate statements, even detected
bankers and analysts lacking confidence
in corporate financial statements.2

Management’s Reluctance for
Disclosure
Time and again the courts have held
that the primary responsibility for the
accuracy of information filed with the
SEC and disseminated among investors
rests with management.3 Management
cannot discharge its obligations in this
respect by employing public accoun
tants. However, left to its own initiative
corporate management is often reluc
tant to disclose fully and freely to the
corporate stockholders.4 Historically,
corporations disclosed very little until
the turn of the twentieth century. Of the
957 corporations listed with the New
York Stock Exchange in 1926 only 339
corporations issued their annual reports
to the stockholders then.5 Finally, the
Exchange made the issuance of cor
porate reports a part of its regular listing
requirements.
There is no doubt the Securities Act
of 1933 has improved the quality and
quantity of disclosure in corporate re
ports but only to the extent the Act re
quires management to comply. For in
stance, management has an option of fil
ing a copy of annual report in partial
compliance with the requirements for
financial statements to be included in its
10-K reports. Out of 150 corporations,
one recent study found, only 17 cor
porations exercised this option confir
ming the difference between the two
reports. The study thus commented, “If
there are no material differences
between two types of reports prepared
by corporations, the efforts should not
be duplicated by preparing a separate
report for the SEC. But a majority of
the corporations subject to the SEC
filings do not exercise the option, imply
ing that there are material differences
between these two types of reports.”6 A
majority of the witnesses appearing
before the Senate Committee on Bank
ing and Currency in June 1963 also sup
ported the contention that corporate
managements are little inclined to dis
close information to investors at their
own initiative. Since banks are not sub
ject to SEC regulations, their annual
reports are often both inadequate and
uniform.7
In brief, the dissatisfaction with the
contemporary corporate disclosure
practices is widespread among the users
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The SEC reluctance to invoke its
authority to prescribe accounting
principles has only increased the
responsibility of the public ac
counting profession.

of corporate reports. The principal
reason for such a discontent lies in the
reluctance of corporate management to
disclose adequately unless pressured by
legislation or outside forces.
The SEC Reluctance
Though the SEC has been making
news in recent months by taking active
interest in the development of accoun
ting principles, historically it has played
a passive role in prescribing accounting
principles. The Securities Act gives the
SEC the authority to prescribe accoun
ting principles in filing the financial
statements filed with it. However, the
commission has not, in general, exer
cised this authority. In the past the SEC
has been content to rely on generally
accepted accounting principles as they
exist or develop with the passage of
time. The Commission has virtually left
the task of developing sound accounting
principles to the accounting profession.
The public accounting profession has
often applauded the inactive role of
SEC for a variety of reasons.8 The com
mission seems to believe the develop
ment of accounting principles is in the
domain of free enterprise and it en
courages the accounting profession to
take initiative in this respect. The SEC
intervenes only in pressing exceptional
situations.9
The Dominance of
Public Accountants
and Security Analysts
Through the years public accounting
and security analysis professionals have
emerged as the principal spokesmen of
the preparer and user groups of publish
ed corporate annual reports. The SEC
reluctance to invoke its authority to
prescribe accounting principles has only
increased the responsibility of public ac
counting profession in this respect.
Notwithstanding management respon
sibility for preparing and distributing
corporate reports to the external users,
the certified public accountants enjoy
the unique privilege of determining
what information to present to the
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stockholders and in what form. They are
closest to the corporate management on
preparer side and are usually grouped
with the preparers of corporate financial
statements. They enjoy an immensely
important place in the organized capital
market and not many corporations ven
ture to publish uncertified financial
statements or statements with qualified
report from the public accountants. Ac
countants enjoy what one security
analyst calls “a point of leverage” in this
respect.10
While discussing what each member
of the user-preparer group could do to
make corporate reports more
meaningful Leonard Spacek of Arthur
Andersen & Co. found that security
analysts, stock exchanges, the SEC, and
even corporate management rely on the
corporation’s public accountant for
adequacy and reliability of the financial
information provided the investor. He
comments, “Thus we have gone the full
circle of financial statement respon
sibility to the investor, and we end up
with the public accountant. In the last
resort, all others rely on him to justify
what is adequate and reliable informa
tion for the investor.”11
On the user side of the corporate an
nual reports, the security analysts have
emerged as the principal surrogates of a
vast number of individual and in
stitutional investors. They not only
represent investors’ information needs
but they are themselves major users of
corporate financial statements. A vast
majority of investors often obtain finan
cial information indirectly via the
studies prepared by the security
analysts. Further, the analysts counsel
on a large proportion of equity invest
ment decisions. Security analysts repre
sent investors because their information
requirements are derived from the needs
of the investors they advise.12
In brief, one finds that of the four
principal parties involved in the
preparation and use of corporate finan
cial statements, namely, corporate
management, the SEC, public accoun
tants and security analysts, the last two
share major responsibility. But how
effectively the public accountants and
security analysts can discharge their
respective responsibilities depends on
how much they understand each other.
The more public accountants under
stand the security analysts’ information
requirements, the better they will be able
to serve their needs. However, the in
vestigation carried out by the author in
dicates a lack of understanding between

the two professions.
Accountants Understanding
of User Information Needs
The author mailed a questionnaire to
a group of randomly selected 300 cer
tified public accountants working with
the national Big Eight firms of CPAs13,
and to 400 chartered financial analysts
to study the extent of public accoun
tants’ understanding of users’ informa
tion needs. The questionnaire contained
58 information items (see table 1 for a
list of information items) selected from a
review of published literature on cor
porate accounting and security analysis.
The questionnaire asked the
respondents to value the significance of
information items in equity investment
decisions on a five point scale.14 In all,
339 replies were received (159 out of 300
from CPAs and 180 out of 400 from
CFAs) giving an overall response rate of
48.4 percent.
Test Results
The author was interested in studying
the extent of accountants’ understan
ding of the security analysts’ informa
tion needs and tested the following
hypotheses from the data collected from
the questionnaire:
There is no significant difference
between the public accountants and
security analysts on the value of ac
counting information items for
equity investment decisions.
The hypothesis was tested in
dividually for each information item by
chi square test at a significance level of 5
percent (a = .05). Table 1 summarizes
the test results for each information
item. Of the 58 information items tested,
the hypothesis was rejected on 37 of
those items. The test results revealed a
lack of consensus between the two
groups on the value of three types of in
formation items.
First, there is a lack of consensus
between the two groups on information
concerning budgetary disclosures, e.g.,
planned capital expenditure for next
twelve months; planned expenditure on
research, development and exploration;
planned expenditure on advertising and
publicity and cash flow projections.
Second, differences exist on informa
tion pertaining to details and
breakdowns, namely, amount and
breakdown of operating expenses;
breakdown of inventory under major
categories; investment in each sub
sidiary company; breakdown of sales,
net operating income, income after tax
and investment by continent or
hemisphere for companies with inter

national operations, and by operating
division, product, line of business or
customer groups for diversified com
panies; terms, annual rentals and
breakdown of long term leases by the
type of property leased, etc.
Finally, consensus is lacking on infor
mation items not traditionally reported
by corporations, viz., amount expended
on human resources; share of market in
major product areas; both FIFO cost
and market value of inventory; names of
top executives, lines of authority and
their renumeration.
Since the hypothesis was rejected for
the following information items also it
seems differences exist between accoun
tants and analysts on a large number of
popularly reported information items.
The chi-square test value was exceeded
for questions about amount of
operating expenses reported; cost of
goods sold reported; earnings per share
reported and the method used in its
computation; amount of inventory
reported and the method used in its
valuation; amount of depreciation
reported and the method used in its
computation; and amount of goodwill
and other intangibles amortized.
The differences between the public ac
countants and security analysts are not
confined to information on projections
alone. The two groups extend their dis
agreements to information items per
taining to the past, such as amount ex
pended on research and development
and exploration; reported capital ex
penditure (additions to physical
facilities); rent payment or receipts on
long term leases and shareholders’
equity and the number of common
shares outstanding.
Perhaps the most interesting results
were found in the case of the following
two popular items in the questionnaire:
earning per share reported for the
period and the method used in its com
putation; and the source and applica
tion of funds statements for the period.
The proposed hypothesis was rejected
for both of these items and the lack of
consensus on the value of these items
was surprising in view of the emphasis
they receive in the literature.2*4567810
15 In accord
14
12
with past findings the present study also
tends to indicate that user and preparer
groups continue to be indifferent to
price-level adjusted corporate reports.16

Conclusion
The principal contention of this paper
is that a lack of understanding exists in
the public accounting profession as to
the information requirements of the

users of corporate annual reports. In a
competitive economy like that of the
United States much burden for im
provement in corporate accounting dis Half-hearted efforts made in the
closure rests with the public accounting past to bring accountants and
profession. The success of the profes security analysts to a common
sion depends on its awareness of users’ understanding have not had much
information requirements.
effect. Both groups see each other
A lack of understanding between the
two professions could be due to a lack of as adversaries rather than com
communication between the security plementary professions.
analysts and the accountants.17 Ap
parently the half-hearted efforts made
in the past to bring the two professional
groups to a common understanding
have not had much effect. Both groups
2Elmo Roper, A Report on What Information
happen to see each other as adversaries People Want about Policies and Financial Con
rather than as complementary ditions of Corporations, Vol. I, (The Con
professions; both professions have been trollership Foundation, Inc., 1948), pp. IIIXXVIII. See also, Thomas H. Sanders, Company
harmed by their mutual distrust. Annual Reports to Stockholders, Employees, and
Another explanation may lie in the flex the Public, (Harvard University, 1949), pp. 181ibility offered by the prevailing variety 226.
3Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 SEC 721
of the “generally accepted accounting
principles.” As long as management can (1939).
4See Surendra S. Singhvi, “Corporate
find an acceptable alternative within the Management’s Inclination To Disclose Financial
GAAP, it can find an approving (and Information,” Financial Analysts Journal, (JulyAugust, 1972), pp. 1-8.
willing) public accountant also.
5Oscar M. Beveridge, Financial Public
In a private enterprise economy the
Relations, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co.,
public accounting profession shoulders 1963), p. 139.
heavy responsibility for developing 6Surendra S. Singhvi, op. cit., p. 2. See Also Sur
sound corporate disclosure practices. endra S. Singhvi, “Disclosure to Whom? Annual
Corporate management is naturally Financial Reports to Stockholders and to the
Securities and Exchange Commission,” Journal
reluctant to disclose much to the outside of
Business, (July, 1968), pp. 347-351.
world. Regulatory agencies like SEC are
7U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking
also hesitant to intervene for obvious and Currency, Hearings Before a Subcommittee:
reasons. Independent public accoun SEC Legislation, 88th Congress, 1st Session. p.
tants not only carry the attest function 106.
8See Louis H. Rappaport, SEC Accounting
but are also expected to innovate and Practice
and Procedure, (The Ronald Press Co.,
improve. However, much of that in Third edition, 1972), Ch. 3.
novation and improvement depends on
9Ibid, Ch. 3.
10See Burton, op. cit., pp. 105, 108 and 144.
understanding the user information —
11Spacek, op. cit., p. 327.
requirements.
12See Horngren, op. cit., pp. 598-604; and James
Accounting professionals have an im C. Stallman, “Toward Experimental Criteria for
pressive array of technical expertise but, Judging Disclosure Improvement,” Empirical
as the present study indicates, they seem Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1969,
to be insensitive to the needs of the p. 30.
13Namely, Arthur Andersen & Co.; Coopers &
readers of financial statements. It may Lybrand;
Ernst & Ernst; Haskins & Sells; Peat
be appropriate to suggest that some Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse &
behavioral insights into user needs are Co.; Touche Ross & Co; and Arthur Young & Co.
14The study used the following five point scale:
as essential as technical competence.
1See Corliss D. Anderson, “The Financial
Analyst’s Needs” in Berkley Symposium on the
Foundations of Financial Accounting, (Universi
ty of California, Berkeley, 1967), pp. 98-109;
Abraham J. Briloff, The Effectiveness ofAccount
ing Communication, Frederick A. Praeger,
1967), pp. 7-54; John C. Burton (ed.), Corporate
Financial Reporting: Conflicts and Challenges,
(American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants, 1969), pp. 97-111; Charles T. Horngren,
“Disclosure: 1957,” Accounting Review, (Oc
tober, 1957), pp. 598-604; Leonard M. Savoie,
“Meeting Financial Consumer Needs,” Financial
Analysts Journal, (March-April, 1969), pp. 47-48;
and Leonard Spacek, A Search for Fairness in
Financial Reporting to the Public, (Arthur
Andersen & Co., 1969), pp. 313-338.

Very Important (VI); Important (I); Neither Im
portant Nor Unimportant (N); Unimportant (U);
and Very Unimportant (VU).
15See John C. Burton, op. cit., pp. 99-100,142144; and Lyn D. Pankoff and Robert L. Virgil,
“Some Preliminary Findings from a Laboratory
Experiment on the Usefulness of Financial Ac
counting Information to Security Analysts,” Em
pirical Research in Accounting: Selected Studies,
1970, pp. 10-12.
16Charles T. Horngren, “Implications for Ac
countants of the Uses of Financial Statements by
Security Analysts,” (Unpublished doctoral disser
tation, University of Chicago, 1955), pp. 6-7; and
Alan R. Cerf, Corporate Reporting and Invest
ment Decisions, (University of California,
Berkeley, 1961), p. 57.
17See Abraham J. Briloff, op. cit.,pp. 219-223.
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Table 1
Test Results of Hypothesis

Information Items

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

Total assets reported, end of period (e.o.p.).
Total current assets reported, e.o.p.
Total current liabilities e.o.p.
Cost of marketable securities, e.o.p.
Market value of Marketable securities, e.o.p.
Amount of revenue and the method used in its recognition (e.g., franchise
business, construction firms, etc), for the period (f.t.p.).
Operating income reported (before non-recurring gains and losses), f.t.p.
Amount and breakdown of operating expenses reported, f.t.p.
Cost of goods sold reported, f.t.p.
Earnings per share reported f.t.p. and the method used in its computation.
Compounded rate of growth in earnings per share for the last
five to ten years.
Dividend per share on common shares, f.t.p.
Amount of inventory reported and the method used in its
valuation, e.o.p.
Breakdown of inventory reported under major categories, e.o.p.
Fifo cost of inventory, e.o.p.
Market value of inventory, e.o.p.
Amount of depreciation reported and the method used in its
computation, f.t.p.
Amount of straight-line depreciation on long-lived assets, e.o.p.
Amount of accelerated depreciation on long-lived assets, f.t.p.
Amount of non-recurring gains and losses reported, f.t.p.
Amount expended on human resources (e.g., hiring, training,
etc.), if material, f.t.p.
Amount of past pension fund liability, if material, e.o.p.
Accounting method followed for research and development, and
exploration costs.
Amount expanded on research, development and exploration, f.t.p.
Accounting method followed for advertising and publicity costs.
Amount expended on advertising and publicity f.t.p.
Accounting method (purchase vs. pooling) followed for each
acquisition and merger completed during the period.
Amount of goodwill recognized in each acquisition completed
during the period.
Amount of goodwill and other intangibles amortized, if
material, f.t.p.
Amount of income tax expense, f.t.p.
Amount of deferred income tax liability or prepaid income tax, e.o.p.
Amount of each subsidiary’s earnings and parent company’s share of
its earnings, f.t.p.
Investment in each subsidiary company, e.o.p.
Minority interest reported in each consolidated subsidiary, e.o.p.
Breakdown of sales, income after tax and investment by continent
or hemisphere (where international operations contribute over 15% of
company’s revenues), f.t.p.
Breakdown of sales, net operating income and investment of diversified
companies by operating division, product, line of business, or customer
group (segmented on the basis of 15% or more contribution to gross revenue or
operating income), f.t.p.
Reported capital expenditures (additions to physical facilities), f.t.p.
Planned capital expenditures for next twelve months.
Planned expenditure on research, development and exploration for next twelve months.
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Chi Square
Statistics

7.7083
5.0329
4.7825
4.8309
6.1968
0.0113

a
b

1.2890
b
68.4882 *R
12.0396 *R
8.9354 *aR
3.6031

1.8909
a
9.1538 *aR
30.8204
19.0719
34.8953
51.4687

*R
*R
*R
*R

82.7123
88.0304
1.5608
14.2516

*R
*R
a
*R

16.9462
16.6582

*R
*R

36.4027
22.4977
49.0298
4.7182

*R
*R
*R

3.4511

19.3622

*R

11.3607
3.2405
65.2620

*R

59.9314
47.6072
38.3400

*R
*R
♦R

51.8965

*R

87.0341
83.2313
40.0120

*R
♦R
*R

*R

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Planned expenditure on advertising and publicity for next twelve months.
Method followed for reporting long term leases, f.t.p.
Rent payments or receipts on long term leases, f.t.p.
Terms, annual rentals and breakdown of long term lease by the type of
property leased (e.g., real estate, equipment, etc.), e.o.p.
Backlog and projection of orders, e.o.p.
Productive capacity and actual output (e.g., steel mills, oil companies,
etc.), f.t.p.
Extent of dependence on a few customers (e.g., defense contracts, foreign
markets, etc.).
Share of market in major product areas, f.t.p.
Total common shareholders’ equity and number of common shares
outstanding, e.o.p.
Number of stock warrants and convertible securities outstanding, e.o.p.
Number and type of common shareholders (e.g., individuals, institutions,
etc.), e.o.p.
Number of shares in the company owned by its officers, e.o.p.
Terms of stock option plan and shares involved, e.o.p.
Amount and breakdown of preferred stock and long-term debt by type,
dividend and interest rate and maturity, e.o.p.
Contractual restrictions on common dividend, if any, e.o.p.
Source and application of funds statements, f.t.p.
Cash flow projections for next two to five years.
Price-level adjusted annual corporate reports as supplementary statements.
Names of top executives, lines of authority and their remuneration.

20.5958
8.6002
40.0490
8.8070

♦R

29.3450
40.7108

♦R
*R

♦R

7.4112
27.9873 ♦R
20.4338 *aR
12.2177
3.6915

6.9335
9.8494
4.3399
9.2978
18.2157
45.6911
5.5317
28.6310

*R

♦R

♦R
♦R
*R

♦ Significant at 5 percent level.
Degrees of freedom for items marked with‘a’: 3
Degrees of freedom for items marked with ‘b’: 2
Degrees of freedom for other items: 4
R= Rejection Range

APPENDIX
Table 2

Questionnaire Responses and Present Position
(Title) of Respondents

CPAs

Title
Partner
Manager
Supervisor
Security Analyst
Salesman
Others
Not Given
Total responses received (1)
Questionnaires mailed (2)
Response rate (1) & (2)

CFAs

74
53
7
——
14
11

35
26
—
58
2
47*
12

159
300
53%

180
400
45%

* Includes such titles as Vice-President, Fund
Manager, Trust Investment Officer, Executive
Vice-President, Consultant, Investment
Counselor, President, Portfolio Manager, Assis
tant Treasurer, Investment Manager, Trustee, etc.
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